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The paper deals with the development of the Baptist movements (Stundism and Pash-
kovism) in late Imperial Russia, their perception by the ecclesiastical and secular author-
ities, the measures undertaken by the Church and government in order to combat the
Protestant sectarianism. Different approaches of the contemporaries to the religious
dissent are being investigated. While the members of educated society, liberals and
moderate conservatives viewed evangelical movements as a reﬂection of social changes in
postreform Russia and a reaction to the shortcomings of the ofﬁcial Church, the ecclesi-
astical authorities treated the rise of evangelicalism as a result of the sectarians’ “igno-
rance” and as a threat to the political and social order of Russia. When conservative tsar
Alexander III ascended in 1881 to the throne, his former tutor and the Chief Procurator of
the Holy Synod Constantine Pobedonostsev launched an energetic campaign against the
heterodoxy based on a combination of repressive and educational measures. This
campaign turned out to be a failure mostly due to passiveness of the ofﬁcial Church which
was paralyzed by the strict control of the state. The position of the secular administration
which was not eager to be drawn into religious struggle also hampered the attempts to
combat the heterodoxy. Finally, the effective repressions against the sectarianism were
paralyzed by the protests of the Senate, supreme juridical body of the Empire which had to
overview the compliance with the law. Though the repressions against the Baptists were
stopped in 1905, they made a negative impact on the Russia’s development contributing to
the sharpening of the social and political contradictions on the eve of revolution.
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sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, HaIn 1900 Constantine Pobedonostsev, the Chief Procu-
rator of the Holy Synod (the lay head of the Russian
Orthodox Church), complained in his report to the tsar that
his attempts to combat the development of Protestant
sectarianism in Russia were paralyzed by decrees of the
Governing Senate, the supreme juridical body of the
Empire.1 This statement in fact summed up results of the
years-long struggle waged by the Russian state and Church1 The history of the struggle between Synod and Senate is described in
details in the memoirs of A.F. Koni, the head of the Senate’s Criminal
Cassation Department. See: Koni, 1913a.
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Baptism) and Pashkovism. Though the main legal prohibi-
tions on the sectarians’ activities were lifted only in 1905, it
had become clear much earlier that the authorities lost
their battle against evangelicalism. Why did the Imperial
state and the ofﬁcial Church of Russia failed to combat the
non-violent religious movement which comprised only the
tiny minority of the Russian population? Why the Church
and state could not cooperate effectively in the ﬁght against
heterodoxy? Why a signiﬁcant part of the secular bureau-
cracy was reluctant to launch the war against the “here-
tics”? All these issues provide an important insight in the
history of the Russian religious life, in the inner working of
the governmental apparatus and in the Church–state rela-
tions on the eve of the epoch of revolutions.
Before addressing these problems, another important
question should be asked: why did the ofﬁcial authorities
paid so much attention to the movement which never
challenged the foundations of Russia’s social and political
order? “The spectacle which is thus represented to us of the
authorities”, wrote with this regard the well-known British
journalist W.T. Stead, “animated as it were by some strange
suicidal mania, spending their time, thought and energy, in
harrying and destroying those who, as all experience has
proved, would be the most trustworthy and loyal subjects
of the Emperor if they were but allowed to obey their
conscience in the matter of religion, is melancholy indeed”.
Due to such a policy, Stead stressed, Russia in matters of
religious liberty was regarded in the West as a medieval
and barbarous power rather than a civilized state of nine-
teenth century.2
The persecutions of evangelical sectarians became, as
a modern historian puts it, a real “public relations debacle
for the autocracy”, attracting a close attention of Russian
and Western public and engendering harsh criticism of the
religious policy of the government.3 “There is scarcely
a prison in South Russia, that does not contain Stundists”,
wrote a British writer R.S. Latimer, “there is scarcely
a convoy of convicts on the way to Siberia which has not in
its midst a Stundist preacher. It is no longer a matter of
mere persecution; it is a determination to extinguish
them”.4 Though the scope and cruelty of the repressions
were to some extent exaggerated in the writings of Euro-
pean and American observers, it goes without saying that
the sectarians experienced serious sufferings as a result of
the governmental policy. What, then, was the reason for
this struggle against religious non-conformists that
reminded the Western observers the times of Torquemada
and Archbishop Laud if not those of Nero and Diocletian?
The Protestant sectarianism in late Imperial Russia has
become over past several years a subject of a number of
fundamental works which seriously deepened our under-
standing of this important historical phenomenon. In their2 Stead, 1888a, pp. 389, 372.
3 Breyfogle, 2005b, p. 219.
4 Latimer, 1909. “Religious intolerance”, noted in his book a famous
American writer George Kennan, “is just rampant in Russia today as it was
in England during the reigns of the Tudors, and it is only prevented from
going to the extremes of personal torture and the oublic stake by the
dread of Western opinion” (Quoted in: Lowe, 1895).books Heather Coleman, Nicholas Breyfogle, and Sergei
Zhuk elucidated signiﬁcant aspects of the sectarian move-
ments, investigating the content of their belief, their role in
the spiritual awakening inpre-revolutionary Russia, and the
reconsideration of religious, political, and national identities
in Russian society engendered by the rise of sectarianism.5
In my article I would like to stress another dimension of
the sectarians’ history analyzing religious dissent as the
object of the governmental policy and exploring its
perception by the Church and secular authorities.
Touching upon the development of Protestant sectari-
anism in late Imperial Russia, it should be noted that its rise
was deeply connected with the changes in Russian social,
economic, spiritual life engendered by the abolition of the
serfdom in 1861. It is not a coincidence that evangelical
sectarianism ﬁrst emerged in the areas where the capi-
talism was intensively developing. The ﬁrst and most
prominent trend in the Protestant movement, Stundism,
appeared in the late 1860s on the territory of contemporary
Ukraine in Kiev and Kherson provinces. The model for the
ﬁrst Stundists were sectarians in the German colonies who
gathered at particular "hours" (in German, Stunden) for
prayer, Bible reading and song. The movement quickly
spread throughout the South and West of the Russian
Empire, to Volyn’, Podol’sk, Ekaterinoslavl, Chernigov,
Taurida, Poltava, Bessarabia, Minsk, and Mogilev provinces.
By the middle of 1880s, in the Kherson region alone there
were about three thousand Stundists, and there were about
two thousand in Kiev Province.6
The reasons which urged Russian and Ukrainian peas-
ants to join the new sect were linked mostly to their search
of the spiritual and moral revival stimulated by the
changing conditions of social and economic life. The ofﬁcial
Orthodox Church could not often satisfy the men and
women who were looking for the freedom of individuality
within the new communities with higher moral standards.
Thus, peasants in the Kherson region being brought to trial
told the police “that the main reason for converting to the
Stunde sect was ... a desire to withdraw from a society in
which all kinds of corrupting vices prevailed, such as
drunkenness, rowdy behavior, thievery, and laziness.When
they joined the religious sect they broke off all ties with
their former associates and entered a new life which gave
them material sufﬁciency”.7 It should be added that the
new religious movements, with their communal self-
government, charity work, and mutual aid, together with
the active teaching of pastors who were often elected,
proved to be much better adapted to postreform reality
than was the bureaucratized ofﬁcial Church.
Of course, the search for the moral awakening was not
conﬁned in the late Imperial Russia only to the lower strata
of the population, peasants and workers. In the middle of
1870s, a second important Protestant movement emerged,
this time among the high society of St. Petersburg. Under
the inﬂuence of the British preacher Lord Radstock, the5 Breyfogle, 2005b; Coleman, 2005a; Zhuk, 2004.
6 Klibanov, 1965, pp. 189–92,203–3,206–9.
7 RGIA (Russian State Historical Archive), f. 797, op. 55, otd. 2, st. 3, d.
96, 1.12.
A. Polunov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 3 (2012) 161–167 163members of the Petersburg aristocracy started to held the
evangelical meetings and organize religious communities.8
The sectarians who soon became known as Pashkovites
(after the name of his leader, Guard Colonel V.A. Pashkov)
distributed religious literature, built and supported schools,
hospitals, teashops, cafeterias, shelters, crafts shops, and
cheap housing for workers. The newmovement also began
to spread among the common folk, primarily in the
industrial center of European Russia: St. Petersburg, Tver,
Moscow, Yaroslavl, Olonets, and Arkhangel’ sk province.
“Pashkovite propaganda” was also found in Simbirsk,
Astrakhan, Orel, Kaluga, Voronezh, Tambov, Riazan, and
Tobol’sk province.9
The third important trend of the evangelicalism was
represented by the members of the old Russian sectarian
groups, Dukhobors andMolokans, who emerged in Tambov
province in central Russia, but were largely resettled in
1830s to Transcaucasia. In 1860s and 1870s some of these
sectarians started to reconsider their beliefs and practices,
stressing the elements of rationalism in their teaching. In
their doctrine, Stundism, Pashkovism, and the “new”
Dukhobor and Molokan movement actually represented
Baptism. They rejected hierarchy, church organization, and
the worship of icons, and they acknowledged the Bible as
their sole authority. The different branches of the Russian
Protestantism tended to uniﬁcation.The Molokane Baptists
of the Caucasus arranged contacts with Pashkov’s organi-
zation, and in 1884 there was a congress of Caucasian and
Ukrainian Baptists. An attempt was even made to convene
a congress of evangelicals in St. Petersburg.10
An appearance and rapid growth of the Protestant
sectarianism in Russia which had hardly any experience
with religious Reformation became in the second half of
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a matter of acute
public discussions. Contemporaries tended to assess this
phenomenon in different ways. The members of educated
society, liberals and moderate conservatives viewed evan-
gelical movements as a reﬂection of the profound changes
in postreform Russia and a reaction to the shortcomings of
the ofﬁcial Church. N.P. Giliarov-Platonov, a well-known
Slavophile journalist, suggested that “the Stunde, like any
sect, appeared for one reason: because the established
Church was not satisfying people’s spiritual needs.... It
would be a mistake to seek the reasons for the Stunde in
the outside inﬂuence of Protestantism.... No Lutheran
soldier could convert anyone to Stundism if the soul of the
hearer were not ready for it. ... There are those who thirst
for spirit; well, give them spirit! ... Do not drive them away
from the Church altogether with police techniques and
restrictive disciplinary requirements”.11 The hierarchs of
the Orthodox Church rejected resolutely such an approach
claiming that religious dissent represents a threat both to
the Church and to the state and should be suppressed by
the police and administrative measures. But of a special
interest was a reaction to the new sectarianism of the8 Heier, 1970.
9 RGIA, f. 797, op. 54, otd. 2, St. 3, d. 63a, 11. 3-6, 44-53 ob., 85 ob.-86.
10 Ibid., 11. 12-13,389, and d. 63b, 11. 8-18, 51-69.
11 Giliarov-Platonov, 1906, pp. 449–50.secular authorities which were supposed to implement the
measures of repression.
Though ofﬁcially obliged to assist the dominant Church,
the lay ofﬁcials strove in many cases to avoid the admin-
istrative and police persecution of the religious non-
conformists. While dealing with the subjects of Empire,
the tsarist bureaucrats tended at the second half of the
nineteenth century to make an emphasis on their political
loyalty and the economic effectiveness, not on the religious
purity of their views. Facing the rise of religious dissent, the
local administrators stressed in their reports that the
sectarians were not breaking any civil laws and posed no
threat to the state order, that persecution would embitter
the non-conformists and provoke conﬂicts while proving
useless and creating an aura of martyrdom around
heterodoxy. Accordingly to the Chief Procurator, one
governor in southern Russia openly refused to deport
Stundists, declaring: “These Stundists have not committed
any crime; they live quietly, they pay their taxes, they obey
the authorities, and they should be allowed to stay.”12
An important factor which hampered the state perse-
cution of heterodoxy was an evolution of the Russia’s legal
system after abolition of serfdom, especially with regard to
the Church–state relationship. The logic of the path on
which the country had embarked during the reforms of
1860–70s demanded that the Orthodox Church be sepa-
rated from the state, that all faiths bemade equal before the
law, and that subjects be given the freedom to choose and
profess any religion. These tendencies were clearly mani-
fest in administrative and juridical practice. After the
legalization of Baptism as a “foreign religion” in Russia
(1879), local authorities began to extend to Russian Prot-
estants the same rights that the German Baptists enjoyed.13
Finally, in 1883 a law was passed that conferred on all
religious dissidents certain civil rightsdin particular, the
right to hold services in prayer houses, to carry internal
passports, and to occupy public positions.14
The hierarchs of the Orthodox Church, as it was noted
earlier, protested against these tendencies striving to
portray the dissidents as the enemies not only of the
Church, but also of the state and social order. ”This is not
just a religious evil but a political and national evil”, wrote
the Exarch of Georgia to the Chief Procurator in 1882.
“Among the masses of the people infected with Stundism
the enemies of Russia and the accomplices of Protestant
Germany are being trained.” In 1884 Bishop Nikanor of
Kherson suggested that Stundism was spread primarily by
“foreign persons,”who, “acting as enemies of the Orthodox
Church, are no less hostile to the Russian state aswell.” “The
Church has appealed to the civil authorities, and does so
now, petitioning for measures to curb grave crimes against
the faith”, asserted the hierarch.15 Similar feelings were
regularly expressed by the Orthodox clergymen during all12 RGIA,f. 797,op. 59, otd. 2, st. 3,d. 156,11. 11 ob.-12.
13 Bobrishchev-Pushkin, 1902a, pp. 36–37, 39-41, 46, 68-69. Coleman,
2005b, pp. 19–20.
14 Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii. Collection 3. Vol.3. No.
1545.
15 RGIA, f. 797, op. 54, otd. 2, St. 3, d. 63a, 11. 384 ob.-385, 54; op. 55, otd.
2, st. 3, d. 96,11.21–23,26.
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had little chance to get an understanding from the civil
authorities. The situation changed in 1881 when the liberal
tsar Alexander II was assassinated by the revolutionaries
and his conservative son Alexander III ascended to the
throne. One of the most inﬂuential advisors of the new tsar
became his former tutor Constantine Pobedonostsev who
occupied since April 1880 the post of the Chief Procurator.
Though often portrayed as an ordinary imperial
bureaucrat who cynically used the Church as an instrument
of the autocracy, Pobedonostsevwas in reality amuchmore
complicated ﬁgure with a speciﬁc set of views regarding
the relationship between the religious and secular spheres.
As John Basil puts it, the famous Chief Procurator was not
just high-placed ofﬁcial but also “a churchman” and “a
religious teacher” for whom “no political argument or
regime could ever satisfy the chief needs of humanity”. The
modern state, in his understanding, was nothing more than
a lifeless gadget which could only achieve moral intelli-
gence from surrounding life. The governmental machine
was in need of moral direction and spiritual inspiration
which could be obtaining only by linking state leaders to
the Church of the majority of population. In fact, as
Professor Basil stressed, the state for Pobedonostsev was
more in need of aid of the Church than vise versa.16
Touching upon the issues of social and political life, the
Chief Procurator asserted that society has to be joined
together by a religious vision and a moral tradition, and in
a healthy nation, the civil action and the values of the
dominant religion should present a common front. Such
a unity was of a special need for the postreform Russia
which underwent a process of radical and often painful
changes. It goes without saying that many of Pobedo-
nostsev’s observations related to the real and very acute
problems of Russia’s modernizing society. At the bottom of
his thinking, however, laid a very archaic and in fact
a primitive idea that the society would perish without an
absolute, monolith-like unity both in secular and religious
spheres. “On paper it is possible to draw a clear line and
separate the ﬁeld of political activity from that of spiritual
and moral activity”, wrote a conservative statesmen. “In
reality it is not. No matter what level of perfection
a logical structure of relations between the Church and the
state may achieve intellectually, it cannot satisfy the simple
minds of the masses of believers”.17
Such an approach urged Pobedonostsev to reject the
freedom of conscience and religious pluralism, which in his
understanding would be harmful for the spiritual unity of
Russia. It should be added that the conservative statesman
was deeply skeptical about the ability of Russian people,
weak and immature in his views, to act independently and
to survive without a state tutelage. Freedom of conscience,
Pobedonostsev declared, will allow “our enemies to
capture masses of our Russian people and turn them into16 Basil, 1995. On the religious policy of Pobedonostsev see also:
Polunov, 1996.
17 Pobedonostsev, 1894, pp. 2–3, 22.
18 OR RGB (Manuscript Division of the Russian State Library), f. 230, k.
4410, ed. khr. 1, 11. 139–40.Germans, Catholics, Mohammedans, and so on, and wewill
lose them forever for the Church and for the fatherland”.18
In this situation, support of a strong visible link between
the state and Church was treated as a main prerequisite of
Russia’s survival.
Of course, the Chief Propcurator clearly understood
that the religious dissent could not be defeated only by
the means of administrative and police repressions. Such
measures, Pobedonostsev asserted, should have only
protected the Church and created the favorable condi-
tions for its educational and missionary activities. In line
with this conception, the Chief Procurator sprang into
vigorous action. In May 1880, literally just days after his
appointment, he appealed to the tsar to put a stop to
Pashkov’s activities. In this connection, a special confer-
ence was convened under the head of the Committee of
Ministers P.A. Valuev. The conference decreed that
Pashkovite meetings be prohibited and that Pashkov and
his close collaborator Count M.M. Korf be deported. After
that, Pobedonostsev kept close track of the situation to
ensure that Pashkov could not come back to Russia.
When necessary he appealed directly to the tsar.19 In
1884 the Pashkovite Society to Encourage Spiritual and
Moral Reading was closed, the literature it published was
conﬁscated, and an “index” was compiled of prohibited
religious publications in which Protestant tendencies
could be detected. Local authorities were told to ferret
out instances of Pashkovite “propaganda”, with the help
of the higher clergy.20
In addition to above-mentioned measures, several other
administrative orders were issued. In 1886 the Minister of
Justice, in agreement with the Chief Procurator, instructed
judicial authorities “to pay special attention to the neces-
sity of more extensive” use of experts from ofﬁcial Church
in cases of crimes against the faith, and a year later he
ordered that “the procuracy be in strict observance of the
institution and swift and proper conduct and resolution of
cases” involving heterodoxy.21 Pobedonostsev did it best
trying to arrange the smooth working of the spiritual and
lay authorities in the ﬁght against sectarianism. In the
course of this work, the clergy reported cases of “propa-
ganda” to the Chief Procurator, and the latter took them to
theMinister of Justice and theMinister of Internal Affairs or
his deputy, who was in charge of the police. The civil
authorities had to report back to the Chief Procurator what
measures they had taken. All these steps should have
created the base of the spiritual activities of the Church
which, as Pobedonostsev hoped, would play the main role
in the ﬁght against the heterodoxy.
Touching upon the measures to be undertaken by the
Church, it should be noted that they played a special role in
Pobedonostsev’deyes.He sincerely believed that the religious
dissent did not have any deep roots in social conditions of19 RGIA, f. 797, op. 54, otd. 2, st. 3, d. 63a, 11.45–47. Pis’ma Pobedo-
nostseva k Aleksandru III, Moscow (1925), Vol. 2, pp. 158, 163.
20 RGIA, f. 797, op. 54, otd. 2, st. 3, d. 63a, 11.16-24,77-81.
21 Obzor deiatel’nosti vedomstva pravoslavnogo ispovedaniia za vremia
tsarstvovaniia imperatora Aleksandra III, St. Petersburg (1901), p. 470.
Vsepoddanneishii otchet ober-prokurora, Sviateishego Sinoda K. Pobe-
donostseva za 1887 god, St. Petersburg (1898), p. 76.
25 RGIA, f. 797, op. 56, otd. 2, st. 3, d. 21, 1. 149. Pobedonostsev, wrote
with this regard W.T. Stead, was “doing his best to galvanize the Church
into a spasmodic display of propagandist zeal”, but he could not “tempt
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sectarians who were deceived by their leaders. “The convic-
tion that the sectarian doctrines are true lives only among the
masses of its benighted and illiterate followers,” Pobedo-
nostsevwrote. “The sectarian leaders themselves ... recognize
the falsity of the doctrine that they preach, but they persist
because they derive considerable material beneﬁts for
themselves.”22 Thus, school and sermon, together with
governmental repressions, should have played a decisive role
in theﬁght againstheterodoxy. In linewith this idea, theChief
Procurator launched a set of measures aimed at the revitali-
zation of the Church’s educational and missionary activities.
Two weeks after the Pashkovite society was closed, Pobedo-
nostsev suggested that Bishop Nikanor of Kherson organize
a higher clerical assembly to deal with the struggle against
Stundism. The assembly, which was held in Kiev in 1884,
passed a number of resolutions designed to weaken the
Stunde. It called for increased study of “rationalistic sectari-
anism” in the spiritual seminaries, the distribution of special
literature, and the appointment of special missionaries to
combat heterodoxy. Worthy priests were to be assigned to
parishes where religious dissent had gained a foothold, and
parish trustee councils were to take up collections for the
poorest parishioners (as a counterweight to the mutual aid
offered by the sectarians). The clergy were ordered to open
schools and libraries, to organize public readings, to conduct
worship services properly, to forbid extortion, and to conduct
themselves decently.23
In addition to these measures, a congress of the higher
clergy, held in Kazan in 1885, ordered the recruitment of
diocesan missionaries. In 1887 the First Missionary
Congress in Moscow introduced district missionaries.24 A
campaign of educational and propagandist activities was
started including the public debates of the missionaries
with sectarians, religious educational sessions designed to
strengthen the Orthodox practice, publication and distri-
bution of anti-sectarian pamphlets. All these measures
permitted the Chief Procurator to report to the tsar that the
religious dissent was losing its inﬂuence and would
disappear soon. In reality, however, the program launched
by Pobedonostsev faced serious obstacles and ﬁnally
turned out to be a failure.
The main reason for this failure was that the dominant
Orthodox Church had no independence from the govern-
mental supervision, its administrative structures were
bureaucratized and over-centralized, and its parishes were
placed under strict administrative control. In this situation,
the Orthodox clergy and laymen remained mostly passive
and did not join the ﬁght against the sectarianism despite
of all Pobedonostsev’s attempts to revitalize their activities.
“I entreat, I beg, the Metropolitan to replace bad priests
with good ones in the parishes that have been infected”,
wrote in 1887 the Chief Procurator to the governor-general
of the SouthwesternProvinces concerning the Kiev Diocese.22 Izvlechenie iz vsepoddanneishego otcheta ... za 1883 g, St. Petersburg
(1885), pp. 266,271.
23 Obzor, pp. 259–62.
24 Ibid, pp. 268–78, 287–300. The Second and the Third Missionary
Congress were held respectively in Moscow and Kazan in 1891 and 1897.“Unfortunately, the Church authorities are not acting with
the vigor that they ought”.25 At the Kiev assembly, Pobe-
donostsev complained to Nikanor, the bishops offered “a
list, a repetition of commonplaces submitted for their
superiors to approve” instead of making “an overall diag-
nosis of their internal ailments” and agreeing among
themselves on general measures of Church discipline.26
The combination of repression and education in the
activities of the Church and state which, as Pobedonostsev
hoped, would play a decisive role in the ﬁght against
sectarianism, proved to be essentially impossible. Because
ecclesiastical leaders were convinced that they had backing
from the state, which could halt the sectarianswith a simple
command, they made no particular attempt to engage in
activitieswhen the outcomewas unpredictable. In response
to resolutions passed by the Kiev Assembly the chief proc-
urator wrote: “Too much space is given to orders that the
civil authorities are to be asked to provide, and in this regard
much that has been noted is so out of keeping with the
circumstances of the time. .. that one sometimes feels like
exclaiming, ’O sancta simplicitas!’ “ .27 On the local levels,
the police ofﬁcials and administrator complained, the
priests andmissioners too oftenmade “the demands.with
respect to favoring Orthodox religious rites”which “exceed
the rights and duties of the police. asking the police to use
force to make the parishioners attend the Church of God”.28
The Chief Procurator did his best to convince religious
leaders that the struggle against heterodoxy was now
primarily their task. “There are many now who are being
punished by the courts and are being banished in accor-
dance with administrative procedures,” Pobedonostsev
wrote in 1893 to Archbishop Illarion of Poltava concerning
the Stundists. “The courts have punished many, and the
government has deported them, but these are only auxil-
iary measures. The main remedy against the Baptists is to
be found in the Church. Unfortunately, however, almost all
the diocese’s reports on the Stunden focus on formal
exhortation and administrative measures: there is no
evidence of any effort to ﬁnd out what kind of man the
parish priest is and howwell he performs”.29 Most of these
admonitions, however, were in vain. Having no real
authority and independence from the secular bureaucracy,
the higher clergy also refused to take responsibility. The
passiveness of the Church hierarchy was not the only
reason for the failure of Pobedonostsev’s program. Another
serious factor was connected with the position of the
governmental authorities. These authorities, despite the
energetic pressure of the powerful tsar’s advisor, were not
eager to be drawn in the war against heterodoxy.the stolidity indifferent Orthodox to bestir themselves about extending
what they regard as the true Orthodox faith” (Stead, 1888b, p. 336).
26 Perepiska K.P. Pobedonostseva s preosviachennym Nikanorom, epis-
kopom Uﬁmskim, Russkii arkhiv, 7 (1915), p. 374.
27 Ibid.
28 RGIA, f. 797, op. 56, otd. 2, st. 3, d. 21, 1 149.
29 Pis’ma K.P. Pobedonostseva preosviashchennomu Illarionu, arkhie-
piskopu Poltavskomu, Russkii arkhiv. 1-6 (1916), pp. 153.
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earlier, treated the religious struggle as a task which was
alien to them and strove not to participate in the measures
which carried the risk of the social upheaval. Although
some administrators (the governors of Kherson, Vitebsk,
and Mogilev and the chief civil administrator of the Cau-
casus) did cooperate with the Church authorities, the
leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was not
enthusiastic about the prospect of religious struggle.30
When the governor of Kherson raised the issue of Stund-
ism in 1883, “the ministry reacted to his reports with
complete apathy,” Bishop Nikanor wrote to Pobedonostsev.
“Theywon’t even address this issue at theministry, because
in their view it lies solely within the purview of the reli-
gious department.”31 Besides the inter-departmental
rivalry, there was another and more serious reason for
the apathy of the Ministry and its agents. The religious
authorities were trying to prosecute even afﬁliation with
heterodoxy, whereas state agencies could punish only
speciﬁc violations of the law. This led to the regular
conﬂicts. In 1887, for example, Father Arsenii, a missionary,
accused the authorities in Kiev District of aiding and
abetting Stundism. On investigation it was found that the
leader of a Stunde, who according to the missionary was
keeping his own birth and death registries with impunity,
was under trial for this behavior, but no crime was proved.
The missionary’s claims that the Stundists had ties with
socialists were not conﬁrmed. An unannounced search was
conducted of a Kiev bookshop which the missionary had
claimed served as a center of Stundist propaganda, but
nothing illegal was found.32
Facing the resistance of secular bureaucracy, Pobedo-
nostsev made vigorous effort in order to persuade it to take
part in the struggle against sectarianism. At the Chief
Procurator’s request, in 1889 the Minister of Internal Affairs
issued a special circular instructing provincial administra-
tions and police not to permit any indulgence toward
sectarians and to cooperate with the clergy.33 By the end of
1880s, Pobedonostsev succeeded in changing of the
membership of the local administration which started to
cooperate more energetically with ecclesiastical authori-
ties.34 But then the Senate, the body charged with ensuring
compliance with the law, lodged a protest. Its Criminal
Cassation Department, headed by a well-known jurist A.F.
Koni, rescinded the decrees closing Stundist prayer houses
on the basis of the law of 1883. In 1892 A.P. Ignat’ev,
governor-general of the Southwestern Provinces, used his30 As Nicholas Breyfogle revealed in his research devoted to the
Dukhobor sectarians in Transcaucasia, the central authorities often
demonstrated ﬂexibility in their approach to the dissidents and strove to
curb the violent and illegal actions of local ofﬁcials (Breyfogle, 1888c).
31 Nikanor. Kievskii sobor 1884 goda, Russkii arkhiv, 9 (1908), p. 92.
32 RGIA, f. 797, op. 56, otd. 2, st. 3, d. 51, 11. 108-16.
33 Ibid., op. 59, otd. 2, st. 3,d. 156,11. 11 ob.-12.
34 At this stage of the struggle against heterodoxy, the elements of
agreement between eccelesiastical and secular authorities became espe-
cially visible. “Local government authorities”, wrote Heather Coleman,
often cited “their religious counterparts as sources” and “complained to the
Ministry of Internal Affairs that evangelicalismwas threatening notmerely
the spiritual orderof the Russian empire, but its civil stability and territorial
integrity as well” (Coleman, 2005c, pp. 21–22).authority to forbidthe Stundists’ prayer meetings, but the
Senate again ruled that action illegal.35
By the beginning of the 1890s the openwarfare between
the judicial and the ecclesiastical departments, backed up by
local administrations, reached unprecedented heights. “The
judicial authorities are now dreadfully antagonistic to the
church authorities,” Tserkovnyi vestnik wrote in 1892.36 At
issue were changes in the laws on heterodoxyd-that is,
counter-reform, abolitionof the lawof1883.At thebeginning
of 1891 Bishop Anatolii of Uman, vicar of the Kiev Diocese,
demanded inpress that the Stundists’ freedomofmovement
be restricted, that their children be taken away from them,
that their places of worship and prayer meetings be closed,
and that any judicial proceedings involving Stundists be
speeded up and simpliﬁed. In the same year the Second
Missionary Congress demanded that Stundists (as well as
Molokane, Pashkovites, and certain other movements) be
forbidden to hold public posts, to come together in prayer
meetings, and to buy or lease land. K.K. Arsen’ev, an observer
writing for Vestnik Evropy, remarked that this actually
amounted to a demand that the law of 1883 be repealed.37
In 1893 the tsar expressed his unhappiness at the
discord between the courts and the administration, and on
4 July 1894 a statute of the Committee of Ministers was
approved declaring Stundism to be the “most dangerous
sect” and forbidding its followers to hold prayer meet-
ings.38 This measure, however, proved to be largely unen-
forceable. Before it could prosecute non-Orthodox, a court
had to determine that they belonged speciﬁcally to the
Stundist sect, but in its doctrine Stundism was actually
Baptism, which was recognized as a tolerated “foreign”
faith, and the Senate pointed out that the Baptists were not
covered by the Statute of 1894.
Elaborating on the Statute of 1894, the Minister of
Internal Affairs and the Minister of Justice sent a circular to
the local authorities in which they stated that “the
followers of the Stunde sect reject all Church rites and
sacraments, and not only do they fail to recognize any
authority and refuse to take oaths or serve in the military...
but they also preach socialist principles”.39 The Senate
demanded that the courts treat as Stundists only those
non-Orthodox whose views and behavior were found to
include all the features listed in the circular, which in
judicial practice never occurred. When experts from the
ecclesiastical department were summoned to court, they
tried to prove that all sectarians were Stundists, but the
Senate ruled that the experts’ assertions could not be
decisive in the absence of factual proof of Stundist
membership. Moreover, it proved impossible to determine
what was and was not a prayer meeting.40
A.M. Bobrishchev-Pushkin, a legal scholar, wrote that, in
handing down a verdict in a case involving Stundists,35 Koni, 1913b, pp. 610–615.
36 Tserkovnyi vestnik. 36 (1892).
37 Tserkovnyi vestnik. 8 (1891). Obzor, pp. 297–98. Arsen’ev, 1904, p. 153.
38 RGIA, f. 797, op. 63, otd. 2, st. 3, d. 402, 11. 2, 21.
39 Ibid., 1. 33 ob.
40 Bobrishchev-Pushkin, 1902b, pp. 119–20, 141–43; Mel’gunov, 1907a,
pp. 60–65.
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paper shufﬂing when it is impossible to motivate ... the
verdict because there is no corpus delicti in the legal sense
– nothingoutwardly manifest, no actionsdbut there are
punitive laws.”41 Invariably the Senate overturned verdicts
in cases involving Stundists. The battle between the judicial
and the religious departments continued unabated,
sending ever-stronger tremors through the state mecha-
nism. No fundamental progress occurred in this sphere
until April 1905, when the edict granting freedom of
conscience took the question of the state’s battle against
heterodoxy off the agenda.
Though the administrative persecution of religious
dissent ended in 1905, the negative consequences of the
repression campaignwere felt until the end of the “anciene
regime”. It drove many non-conformists into political
protest persuading them that they could achieve a full
religious freedom only after the overthrow of the
monarchy. “Persecution by governmental authorities,” as
the historian S.P. Mel’gunov suggested, “brought sectarians
together into an opposition camp and forced them to
analyze the existing state order”.42 Revolutionaries also
made extensive use of cases of religious persecution in their
struggle against the established order. The propensity to
put down religious heterodoxy with “strong-arm” tactics
led to harsh reprisals by village authorities against non-
Orthodox, and sometimes to mob justice. V.D. Bonch-
Bruevich, an expert on religious movements, wrote:
“Sectarians were forced to pluck nettles with their bare
hands; they were lashed with birch rods and their bodies
burned with cigarettes; their hands were squeezed in vises
and burned with hot iron; their backs were burned and
their beards pulled in vises down their spines; and
women’s nipples were pinched until they bled”.43 The non-
Orthodox, too, responded with violence. It is not difﬁcult to
see here the ﬁrst signs of the wave of brutality that gripped
Russia in the period of revolution and Civil War.
Summing up the history of the state repressions against
the Protestant sectarians in the second half of nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, it should be noted that the
key issues of Russia’s social, political, and religious
development were at that time at issue. Could the reli-
gious non-conformist be a loyal subject of the Empire?
Was it possible to introduce in Russia the modern
conception of a secular citizenship? Should the religious
matters be separated from the governmental supervision?
The authorities gave at the end of nineteenth century
a negative response to all these questions launching the
campaign of the persecution of religious dissent. This
campaign, however, proved to be a failure. It was impos-
sible to organize effective ideological repressions in the
state where the independent judiciary and relatively free
press existed and where the contacts with the West were41 Bobrishchev-Pushkin, 1902c, pp. 141, 144, 145.
42 Mel’gunov, 1907b, p. 78.
43 Ibid. p. 74. The brutality and arbitrariness of the local authorities, as
Nicholas Breyfogle has shown, played signiﬁcant role in deteriorating of
the relationship between the government and religious dissenters
(Breyfogle, 2005d, pp. 242, 245).maintained. The position of the secular administration
which was not eager to be drawn into religious struggle
also hampered the attempts of the ecclesiastical authori-
ties to combat the heterodoxy. In 1905, the government
had to make concessions and to introduce religious
freedom in Russia. It was too late, however. In 1917, a new
ideocratic regime emerged, based on the Marxist ideology
and the ofﬁcial atheism, which suppressed not only Prot-
estant sects, but the Orthodox Church as well.
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